













This	article	examines	 the	ways	 in	which	offenders1	are	 required	 to	provide	very	particular	
accounts	 of	 themselves	 and	 to	 self‐narrate	 in	 confined	 ways.	 Drawing	 on	 ethnographic	
fieldwork	and	interviews	conducted	in	the	New	South	Wales	justice	system,	it	explores	how	
the	 stories	 that	 offenders	 are	 made	 to	 accept	 and	 tell	 about	 themselves	 often	 bear	 little	
relationship	to	their	own	reflections.	It	analyses	how,	despite	the	expectations	of	judges	and	
prison	 authorities,	 these	 self‐narratives	 are	 not	 products	 of	 an	 offender’s	 soul‐searching	































with	 his	 parole	 officer	 and	 failing	 to	 attend	 a	 therapeutic	 program.	 Now,	 at	 a	 public	 court	
hearing,	 he	 appeared	 (via	 audio‐video	 link	 from	 prison)	 before	 the	 State	 Parole	 Authority	 of	
New	 South	Wales,	 while	 his	 counsel	 argued	 for	 his	 re‐release.	 Through	 his	 lawyer,	 the	 court	
learnt	that	the	inmate	arrived	to	meet	his	parole	officer,	waited	for	several	hours,	but	the	officer	








At	 the	 time	 this	 prisoner	 was	 applying	 for	 parole,	 another	 inmate	 in	 another	 prison	 in	 New	
South	Wales	 was	 reflecting	 on	 his	 own	 sentence.4	 Ten	 years	 earlier,	 in	 a	 sentencing	 hearing	










all’,	 he	 said.	 The	 narrative	 of	 him	 and	 the	 offence,	 crafted	 to	 obtain	 a	 conviction,	 and	 to	 fit	 a	
chaotic	 incident	with	conflicting	and	 complicated	evidentiary	elements	 into	 the	 constraints	of	
the	 court	 environment,	 had	 become	 a	 barrier	 to	 him	 accepting	 any	 responsibility	 for	 the	
incident.	 And	 yet	 in	 prison,	 he	 had	been	 repeatedly	 pressured	 to	 provide	 authorities	with	 an	
account	of	himself	that	fitted	an	acceptable	legal	narrative	that	he	did	not	accept.	
	
This	 article	 critically	 analyses	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 constructed	 narratives	 about	 the	 offender	





concerning	 his	 past	 actions	 and	 experience:	 rather,	 they	 are	 products	 of	 an	 official	 legal	
narrative	being	 imposed	on	an	offender	whose	 capacity	 to	 own	 and	enact	 such	 a	narrative	 is	
already	seriously	compromised.		
	
The	 article	 draws	 on	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 and	 interviews	 carried	 out	 by	 both	 authors	 in	
separate	 contexts	 in	 the	 New	 South	Wales	 criminal	 justice	 system	 between	 2009‐2013:	 Hall	
with	 prisoners	 5	 and	 Rossmanith	 with	 judges,	 lawyers,	 victims,	 post‐release	 prisoners,	 and	
parole	 authority	members.6	We	 argue	 that	 the	 justice	 system	 is	 replete	with	 expectations	 for	
offenders	to	provide	very	particular	accounts	of	themselves:	that	is,	to	self‐narrate	in	confined	
ways.	 Consider	 the	 two	 opening	 accounts:	 in	 the	 first	 example,	 the	 prisoner	was	 expected	 to	










From	 the	police	 investigation	onwards,	 ‘the	offence’	 and	 the	psychosocial	narrative	about	 the	
offender	 is	 constructed	and	 imposed	on	the	offender	 for	 the	duration	of	his	 ‘journey’	 through	
the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘lived	 sentence’	 (Hall	 2014),	 we	
demonstrate	 how	 this	 constructed	 narrative	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 offender	 through	 in‐court	
processes	and	throughout	their	time	in	prison.	These	stories	–	what	we	call	‘imposed	stories’	–	
are	 sutured	 to	 the	 offender.	McConville	 et	 al.	 (1991)	 have	 shown	how	 the	 facts	 of	 a	 case	 are	
created	outside	the	offender,	separate	from	him	or	her,	as	a	document	to	gain	a	conviction.	We	
build	on	this	notion	to	show	how	the	offender	is	then	expected	to	attach	themselves	to	–	in	other	
words,	 to	 own	 –	 the	 official	 narrative	 of	 police	 facts.	 On	 sentence,	 further	 psychosocial	
narratives	 about	 the	offender	help	 solidify	 the	account	 to	 form	 the	official	 story	 to	which	 the	
prisoner	must	adhere.	For	prisoners,	some	of	whom	have	negotiated	the	welfare	and	criminal	






them;	 they	 must	 perform	 these	 stories.	 Once	 incarcerated,	 for	 instance,	 offenders	 are	
persistently	required	to	‘give	good	narrative’;	that	is,	to	successfully	achieve	release	they	must	
fully	 accept	 the	 official	 account	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 psychosocial	 account	 which	 has	 been	
constructed	 about	 them	 as	 people.	 For	 those	 offenders	 engaged	 in	 offence‐specific	 programs,	
the	 enactment	 of	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility,	 remorse	 and	 redemption	 is	 strongly	 related	 to	
their	 success	 in	 getting	 parole.	 We	 examine	 the	 ways	 the	 inmate’s	 adoption	 of	 acceptable	






authority	 members?	 And	 what	 are	 the	 qualities	 that	 resonate	 with	 the	 feelings	 of	 judges	
(Rossmanith	2015)	in	matters	such	as	remorse	or	attitudes	towards	the	offence?	We	argue	that,	
when	it	comes	to	authorities	making	decisions	about	offenders,	those	offenders’	own	stories	and	
story‐telling	 tactics	are	crucial	 factors.	As	Arthur	Frank	(2010:	3)	writes	 in	his	book	on	socio‐
narratology:	‘Stories	work	with	people,	for	people,	and	always	stories	work	on	people,	affecting	
what	 people	 are	 able	 to	 see	 as	 real’.	 Scholars,	 mainly	 in	 philosophy	 and	 psychology,	 have	






a	 paucity	 of	 research	 concerning	 offenders’	 actual	 experiences	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	
This	article	contributes	to	that	slowly	growing	body	of	socio‐legal	and	criminology	scholarship	
concerned	with	examining	the	daily	practices,	and	experiences	of	people	who	work	in,	and	who	
find	 themselves	 caught	 up	 in,	 the	 justice	 system	 (see	 Crewe	 2009,	 2013;	Hall	 2014;	 Schinkel	
2014).	 The	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘lived	 sentence’	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 a	 narrow,	 legalistic	 view	 of	







Our	 work	 builds	 on	 that	 empirical	 research	 involving	 ‘offender	 narratives’:	 for	 instance,	 the	
ways	 in	 which	 legal	 narratives	 about	 people	 get	 constructed	 and	 deployed.	 Drawing	 on	
ethnographic	observation	of	police	practices,	McConville,	Sanders	and	Leng	(1991)	have	shown	
how	police	construct	 the	 legal	narrative	through	 the	process	of	 investigation.	They	argue	 that	








While	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 ‘that	 these	 primary	 facts	 exist,	 [instead]	 they	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	
process	of	construction	…	Facts	are	not	elicited,	they	are	created’	(McConville,	Sanders	and	Leng	
1991:	 65‐66).	 The	 typology	 of	 interrogative	 questions	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 expert	
investigator,	 creating	 a	 case	 against	 the	 defendant,	 does	 not	 allow	 the	 development	 of	 the	
suspect’s	 narrative,	 but	 produces	 answers	 compatible	 with	 the	 need	 for	 the	 elements	 of	 the	
offence	 to	 be	 satisfied:	 ‘these	 [types	 of	 questions]	 have	 one	 other	 crucial	 property:	 they	 are	
almost	 never	 followed	 by	 “neutral”	 questioning	 designed	 to	 elicit	 the	 suspect’s	 own	 story’.	
Indeed,	McConville,	 Sanders	 and	 Leng	 (1991:	 71)	 assert,	 the	whole	 interview	 is	 designed	 ‘to	
suppress	 any	 attempt	 to	 introduce	 exculpatory	 material	 into	 the	 interview’.	 Kate	 Haworth	
(2009)	has	developed	these	insights	to	argue	that	the	police	interview	constitutes	an	interaction	
where	 only	 one	 side	 is	 truly	 prepared	 for	 the	 ‘multi‐audience’	 nature	 of	 the	 contact.	
Unbeknownst	 to	 the	 defendant	 in	 the	 police	 station,	 the	 official,	 legal	 narrative	 being	
constructed	there	and	then	will	be	later	subjected	to	the	multiple	audiences	of	court,	prison	and	




Over	 the	past	several	decades,	a	 significant	body	of	work	has	emerged,	particularly	 in	 the	US,	
but	 also	 in	 civil	 law	 countries,	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 narrative	 in	 the	 reception	 of	 evidence	
during	the	trial	process	(see	Brooks	and	Gewirtz	1996).	As	has	been	acknowledged	in	relation	
to	the	way	trial	judges	receive	evidence	in	the	Netherlands,	‘a	good	story	is	worth	half	the	proof’	
(Wagenaar,	 van	 Koppen	 and	 Crombag	 1992:	 44).	 Such	 work	 has	 traditionally	 focused	 on	






understood	 by	 fact‐finders	 and	 arbiters	 of	 law.	 She	 has	 also	 shown	 how	 the	 process	 of	
segmenting	or	 fragmenting	the	narrative	by	questioning	begins	 in	the	police	 interview	(Eades	
2008:	 210).	 Weisman	 (2004,	 2009),	 Hall	 (2014)	 and	 Rossmanith	 (2015)	 have	 similarly	
illustrated	how	sentencing	and	other	criminal	justice	processes	contain	implicit	expectations	of	
offenders	 to	 act	 and	 speak	 in	 certain	 ways	 (including,	 for	 instance,	 the	 construction	 of	 an	
acceptable	remorse	narrative).		
	
In	 this	 article,	we	not	 only	 acknowledge	 that	 courts	 and	prisons	 implicitly	 expect	 a	 degree	of	










programs	 –	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	way	 that	 prisoners	 are	 further	 distanced	 from	 attaching	
themselves	to	a	self‐narrative	that	they	 feel	more	closely	 ‘belongs’	 to	 them.	Our	work	extends	





properly	 constructed	 in	 terms	of	a	 ‘rational’	 and	 ‘emotional’	binary,	 as	 if	 those	were	separate	
domains	 (see	 Bandes	 and	 Blumenthal	 2012).	 In	 particular,	 our	 work	 builds	 on	 the	 growing	
scholarship	 concerned	 with	 examining	 the	 range	 of	 factors	 influencing	 judges’	 judgments,	







Jacqueline	 Tombs	 (2008)	 has	 expressed	 concerns	 that	 judges	 are	 moving	 away	 from	
‘imaginative’	 sentencing	 to	 ‘imaginary’	 sentencing	 (see	 also	 Rossmanith	 2013);	 and	 Katja	
Franko	 Aas	 (2005)	 has	 critically	 analysed	 the	 rise	 of	 technocratic	 instruments	 in	 sentencing	
practices.	 We	 do	 not	 see	 any	 contradiction	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 these	 factors	 and	 our	
contention	 that	 expectations	 to	 provide	 acceptable	 narrative	 form	 another	 type	 of	 discursive	
constraint	 on	 the	 prisoner/offender.	 That	 the	 increasing	 reliance	 on	 risk‐based	 thinking	
constrains	the	acceptable	narratives	available	to	offenders	only	supports	our	argument	that	the	
offender	is	unable	to	present	an	alternative	narrative	that	will	be	consonant	with	the	demands	
of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Technocratic	 justice	 requires	 stories	 that	 can	 be	 easily	
categorised,	sorted	and	stored.	
	
All	 the	scholarship	cited	above	has	adopted	various	methodologies	 in	order	 to	 investigate	 the	
relevant	 objects	 of	 study.	 Among	 these,	 ethnographic	 approaches	 are	 emerging	 as	 especially	
rich	ways	 to	reveal	otherwise	hidden	dimensions	of	people’s	practices	and	experiences	 in	 the	
justice	 system.	 Spending	 extended	 time	 with	 people	 –	 through,	 for	 example,	 participant	
observation	and	lengthy	interviews	–	allows	for	unique	insights	into	those	people’s	daily	lives.	It	
accesses	aspects	of	those	people’s	lives	and	working	practices	that	are	most	meaningful	to	them.	
Both	authors	of	 this	 article	 carried	out	 significant	 ethnographic	 fieldwork:	 in	2010	and	2011,	
Hall	 conducted	 30	 lengthy	 interviews	with	male	 prisoners	 serving	more	 than	 three	 years	 in	
seven	 medium	 and	 maximum	 security	 prisons	 in	 NSW;	 between	 2010‐2013,	 Rossmanith	








Beginning	with	the	police	 investigation,	 the	construction	of	 the	 legal	story,	which	will	 initially	
provide	the	case	against	the	defendant,	 is	solely	 in	the	hands	of	police	and	often	occurs	in	the	


















If,	at	 the	time	of	 the	police	 investigation,	the	official	 legal	narrative	 is	constructed,	 it	 is	during	
court	 processes	 that	 this	 story	 is	 sutured	 to	 the	 offender.	 It	 is	 at	 this	 stage	 when	 the	 story,	
moulded	 though	 it	 will	 be	 by	 in‐court	 processes,	 is	 forcibly	 accepted	 and	 performed	 by	 that	
offender.9	 These	 processes	 involve	 pressure	 for	 offenders	 to	 offer	 up	 a	 confined	 narrative	 of	
themselves.	For	example,	increasingly	in	the	NSW	criminal	courts	there	is	a	veiled	expectation	
for,	 and	 pressure	 on,	 offenders	 to	 give	 sworn	 evidence	 at	 sentence	 that	 indicate	 remorse.	 As	
Rossmanith	(2015)	points	out,	recent	 legislative	changes	to	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	
Act	1999	No.	92	(NSW)	concerning	evidence	of	remorse,	have	raised	questions	about	whether	or	
not	 offenders	who	make	 claims	 of	 remorse	 are	 required	 to	 give	 sworn	 evidence.	 Rossmanith	
shows	how	the	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	concluded:		
	
…	 first,	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 statutory	 requirement	 that	 an	 offender	 give	 evidence	
before	 remorse	 can	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 sentence’;	 and	
second,	 ‘in	assessing	the	weight	of	evidence	of	remorse	[the	 judge	was]	entitled	
to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	the	[offender]	did	not	give	evidence’.10	In	other	
words,	 in	 order	 to	 argue	 you	 are	 remorseful,	 you	 don’t	 have	 to	 get	 into	 the	
witness	box	 and	 speak	of	 your	 remorse,	but	 you	 are	probably	disadvantaged	 if	
you	don’t	(Rossmanith	2015:	169).	
	
In	 giving	 this	 sworn	evidence,	 offenders	must	 accept	 the	official	 legal	 narrative	 –	 the	 agreed‐
upon	facts	–	and	try	to	make	it	their	own	through	(enacted)	self‐narration.	For	example,	when	




























implicitly	 expect	 a	 degree	 of	 narrative	 competence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 defendants	 and	 offenders	
(Bartels	 and	 Richards	 2013;	 Eades	 2008;	 Martin,	 Zappavigna	 and	 Dwyer	 2007;	 Rossmanith	
2014).	We	argue,	however,	that	in	sentencing	matters,	it	is	not	simply	any	sort	of	self‐narration	





acknowledgment	 of	 the	 offence	 (2009:	 52).11	 Weisman	 points	 out	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
enacting	remorse,	an	offender’s	admission	of	responsibility	(‘acknowledgment’)	for	the	offence	
is	 far	more	complex	than	merely	a	plea	of	guilty;	 there	 is	 ‘the	expectation	 that	 the	remorseful	
offender	 acknowledge	 their	 agency	 in	 perpetrating	 the	 offense’	 (2009:	 52).	 We	 suggest,	




internality	 –	 ‘on	 the	 inner	 life	 of	 the	 transgressor’	 (Weisman	 2009:	 48)	 –	 we	 suggest	 that	
offender	 stories	 are	 imposed	 on	 offenders	 from	 the	 outside.	 Such	 self‐narratives	 are	 not	
products	of	 soul‐searching	but	 rather	an	awkward	suturing	 together	of	official	 legal	narrative	
and	an	offender	whose	capacity	to	perform	such	a	narrative	is	seriously	compromised.		
	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 remorse	 assessment	 and	 to	 sentencing	matters	more	 generally,	 the	 court’s	
preoccupation	 with	 the	 inner	 life	 of	 the	 offender	 results	 in	 further	 psychosocial	 narratives	
becoming	part	of	the	prisoner’s	story.	For	example,	a	NSW	senior	crown	prosecutor	and	former	
defence	 counsel	 explained	 how	he	would	 encourage	 a	 remorse	 narrative‐enactment	 from	his	
client:		
	
If	 I	was	 defence	 counsel,	what	 I’d	 be	 inclined	 to	 do	 is	 to	 say	 [to	 the	 offender],	














In	 court,	 the	 judiciary,	 without	 even	 necessarily	 realising	 it	 themselves,	 expect	 a	 particular	
narrative	 performance	 from	 offenders:	 a	 ‘remorse	 habitus’	 (Rossmanith	 2014:	 21‐22)	 that	
involves	 a	 whole‐hearted	 acceptance	 of,	 and	 performance	 of,	 the	 official	 legally	 agreed‐upon	
facts,	 together	with	 a	 personal	 story.	 A	 NSW	magistrate	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 say	 that,	 when	 an	
offender	gets	into	the	witness	box	and	tells	his	story	(that	is,	when	an	offender	gives	evidence	of	
his	remorse),	he	ceases	to	be	‘other’	and	instead	becomes	‘like	us’.	The	offender’s	self‐narrative	
allows	 the	 magistrate	 to	 identify	 with	 that	 offender.	 Drawing	 on	 her	 interviews	 with	 the	
judiciary,	 Rossmanith	 has	 written	 of	 so‐called	 ‘successful’	 remorse	 narrative‐enactments	 of	
offenders,	 and	 the	profoundly	affective	dimension	of	 them.	She	argues	 that,	when	 it	 comes	 to	
offenders	getting	into	the	witness	box	and	‘giving	voice’	to	their	remorse,	‘something	often	gets	






In	 other	 words,	 people’s	 stories	 –	 the	 self‐narration	 they	 enact	 –	 are	 co‐constituted.	 Eades	
writes	that	 ‘it	 is	problematic	 to	view	the	stories	which	emerge	 in	 these	 [legal	and	courtroom]	
contexts	 as	 the	 sole	 product	 of	 the	 storyteller’	 (2008:	 214;	 see	 also	 Baldwin	 and	McConville	










‘Looking	back	 I	 think	 it	was	a	bit	 of	 psychobabble,’	David	explained	 to	Rossmanith	during	 an	
interview:	
	
But	 the	 line	 I	 ran	 [in	 the	 letter]	was:	 ‘Looking	 at	 all	 this	 now,	 I’ve	 always	 been	
emotionally	 independent.	 When	 I	 started	 using	 drugs	 I	 thought	 it	 was	 just	 a	
choice,	 a	 hedonistic	 thing	 and	 a	 matter	 of	 my	 own	 sovereignty.	 But	 now,	 in	
response	to	it	being	put	to	me	by	people	in	the	therapeutic	community,	I	realise	
that	cannot	be	right	because	normal	people	don’t	end	up	with	smack	habits	and	




that	 I’ve	 been	 drug	 and	 alcohol‐free	 for	 eight	 weeks,	 that	 I’m	 going	 to	 NA	
meetings	and	that	I’m	taking	one	day	at	a	time.	As	the	judge	read	it,	I	knew	he	was	
impressed.	 I	 knew	 the	 letter	would	 play	well.	 But	 it	 also	 happened	 to	 be	 true.	
When	the	judge	read	it,	he	looked	at	me	–	really	looked	at	me	–	for	the	first	time.	I	













During	 modern	 trial	 and	 sentencing	 procedures,	 the	 prisoner	 is	 often	 silent,	 speaking	 only	
through	his	legal	representative,	rarely	exposing	himself	by	giving	evidence	in	the	witness	box,	
with	the	significant	exception	being	that	of	the	enactment	of	remorse.	As	soon	as	they	enter	the	
prison	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 therapeutic	 gaze	 of	 prison	 rehabilitation,	 prisoners	 must	
immediately	 accept	 and	 enact	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 definition	 of	 themselves	
contained	 in	 the	 psychosocial	 narratives	 of	 the	 sentence.	 This	 involves	 a	 complex	 range	 of	
internal	 and	 external	 processes	 for	 the	 prisoner	 who	 is	 already	 adapting	 to	 the	 vagaries	 of	
prison	 life.	He	must	 accept	and	endure	 the	denunciatory	and	punitive	 effects	of	 the	 sentence,	












are	 developed.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 facts	 about	 the	 offence	 (via	 the	 ‘fact	 sheet’	 or	 the	





into	 re‐telling	 it.	 From	 the	 very	 beginning,	 they	 have	 the	 dilemma	 of	 ‘narrative	 authenticity’	
(Frank	2010:	11);	according	to	them,	‘their’	story	isn’t,	and	was	never,	theirs.	Moreover,	there	is	
little	 opportunity	 for	 ‘narrative	 ambush’,14	 as	 the	 circumstances	 in	 prison	 do	 not	 afford	
prisoners	the	opportunity	to	develop	a	self‐narrative	that	they	feel	more	accurately	represents	
who	 they	 feel	 they	 are,	what	 they’ve	 done,	 and	why	 they’ve	 done	 it.	 At	 stake,	 of	 course,	 is	 a	
prisoner’s	parole	date.15	
	




‘Even	 as	 demands	 are	 placed	 on	 them	 to	 take	 on	 the	 project	 of	making	 themselves	 over	 into	
rational,	self‐possessed	responsible	agents,	opportunities	to	actually	do	that	are	sorely	lacking’	





Interviewer:	 That’s	 an	 interesting	 way	 to	 describe	 it	 ...	 ‘exhausting’.	 Because	
you’re	with	yourself	all	the	time?	
Chris:	You	don’t	know	what’s	going	on	around	you	so	you’re	constantly	battling	
with	 yourself	 trying	 to	 describe	what	 it	might	 be	 or	might	 not	 be	…	 but	 it’s	…	
exhausting,	because	I	don’t	care	how	tough	you	are,	or	how	you	want	to	portray	
yourself	being	a	hard	person,	you	still	need	that	contact	verbally	or	whatever	…	
When	 you	 don’t	 know	what’s	 going	 on	 around	 you	 and	 you’ve	 got	 no	 control,	
even	more	 so,	 it	 is	 exhausting	 ’cause	 it’s	 a	 constant	 battle	 to	 try	 and	 reassure	
yourself.		
	





The	 prison	 system	 is	 a	 site	 that	 not	 only	 enforces	 physical	 control	 on	 the	 prisoner	 but	 also	
imposes	‘discursive	confinement’	(McKendy	2006:	496).	Chris	spoke	of	the	lack	of	talk,	but	even	
talking	 itself	 has	 consequences	 in	prison	 (for	 example,	 unstructured	 interactions	on	 the	wing	











anything	 which	 could	 compromise	 their	 situation.	 Moreover,	 the	 prison	 experience,	 together	
with	 the	quality	 of	 prisoners’	 lives	before	 prison,	makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 speak	directly	
about	their	situation.		
	
Particular	 offender	 narratives	 are	 considered	 so	 important,	 so	 central	 to	 the	 offender’s	
rehabilitation	 (and	 by	 extension	 to	 his	 parole	 release),	 that	 prisoners	 who	 refuse	 to	 give	 an	
acceptable	 narrative	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 crimes	 are	 viewed	 with	 much	 suspicion.	 Weisman	
(2004)	has	written	of	the	sorts	of	remorse	expectations	placed	on	offenders	and	how,	in	cases	of	
wrongful	 conviction,	prisoners	who	maintain	 their	 innocence	are	 severely	disadvantaged.	But	
even	those	prisoners	who	have	pleaded	guilty	are	still	expected	to	offer	particular,	constrained	
self‐narratives,	 and	 are	 further	 punished	 for	 not	 so	 doing.	 For	 instance,	 ‘Mario’,	 serving	 a	















given	 a	 format	 and	 are	 forced	 to	 produce	 an	 ‘autobiography’,	 which	must	 match	 the	 official	
record	held	by	staff.	Held	to	an	account	that	is	seen	to	embody	‘truth’,	any	deviation	will	be	seen	
as	a	 failure	 to	accept	responsibility.	Subjective	meaning	and	affect	are	excised	 from	their	past	
life	leaving	a	collection	of	dates	and	events	(see	Waldram	2007).	The	way	that	the	life	story	of	







‘felt	 stupid	 at	 the	 time’,	 but	 in	 hindsight	 it	 changed	 his	 life.	 He	 had	 to	 write	 his	 own	
autobiography	 ‘from	my	 earliest	 childhood	memory,	 through	 school,	 through	 all	my	 criminal	





There	were	 twelve	guys	 in	our	group,	 and	 ten	of	 them	came	up	with	 ‘unloved’.	
[The	psychologists	were]	trying	to	say	that	there’s	a	reason	why	things	went	the	
way	they	did.	 I	 tried	 to	 tell	everyone	that	 I	went	 the	way	 I	did	because,	when	I	
was	 young,	 I	 saw	 [that]	my	 friends	had	 everything	because	 they	were	 stealing,	
and	I	had	nothing.	I	saw	how	easy	they	were	getting	it	and	I	just	wanted	it.	There	
was	no	 reason	behind	 it.	 [The	psychologists]	were	 trying	 to	 tell	me	 that	 it	was	
because	I	didn’t	have	a	father	figure	and	that	I	was	unloved	–	so	I	said	to	them,	












to	 the	 effacement	 of	 the	 socioeconomic	 reality	 of	many	 prisoners	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 privileged	
psycho‐narrative	of	personal	responsibility.	
	
The	 lack	 of	 control	 prisoners	 feel	 over	 stories	 of	 their	 lives	 is	 expressed	 by	 a	 prisoner	 who	










John	found	 it	unnerving	 that	program	staff	had	more	 information	than	he	did	about	himself.19	
Information	is	power,	made	explicit	by	the	use	of	the	official	narrative	as	a	disciplinary	tool	(see	
Crewe	2009).	Here	the	prisoner,	without	having	access	to	it,	must	enact	the	version	of	himself	





[I	 asked	 them]	what	 are	you	going	 to	do	with	 it?	 [They	 say],	 ‘Oh	no,	we	give	 it	
straight	back	 [to	 you]’.	 Bullshit.	 You	 take	 it	 into	 that	 room,	 you	 read	 it.	Do	you	





that	offender.	Much	 like	 the	 imposed	narratives	of	 the	police,	prosecution	and	the	courts,	 this	





traced	 through	 the	development	of	 the	official	 legal	 narrative	of	 the	offence,	 and	 through	 the	
development	 of	 a	 psychosocial	 narrative	 in	 prison	 that	 will	 enable	 the	 prisoner	 to	 negotiate	
conditional	 release.	 The	 way	 this	 narrative	 is	 attached	 (sutured)	 to	 the	 offender	 highlights	
offenders’	 lack	of	 agency	 in	 the	presentation	of	 personal	 and	offence	data.	Personal	details	of	
motivation	and	life	history	are	presented	in	a	format	that	suits	the	legal	purpose.		
	
The	way	 judicial	officers	and	parole	decision‐makers	 receive	and	 interpret	 the	 information	 in	




























6	 Pseudonyms	are	used	 for	offenders.	While	 several	 judges	 and	 lawyers	 interviewed	were	willing	 to	be	 identified,	
most	were	not,	so	participants	have	been	de‐identified.		
7	 In	 her	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 police	 interviews,	 Kate	 Haworth	 uses	 Watson’s	 distinction	 between	 invited	 and	
uninvited	 stories:	 ‘the	 teller	 of	 an	 invited	 story	 has	 to	 tell	 the	 story	 the	 recipient	wants	 and	 has	 asked	 to	 hear’	
(Haworth	2009:	40).		
8	 In	 the	 small	minority	 of	 cases	where	 there	 is	 a	plea	of	 not	 guilty	 (more	 likely	where	 the	 offence	 is	 serious),	 the	
narrative	of	 the	offence	 is	contained	 in	the	trial	 transcript,	and	where	a	guilty	verdict	results,	summarised	 in	the	
sentencing	comments	of	the	judge.	
9	We	refer	here	to	sentencing	matters,	which	comprise	the	bulk	of	criminal	court	processes.	During	trials,	defendants	





12	 Hall	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 the	 aims	 of	 sentencing	 must	 be	 operationalised	 by	 the	 prisoner	 by	 demonstrating	 or	








and	 lack	of	 remorse	are	 increasingly	being	 reconceptualised	as	an	all	 too	human	attempt	 to	 regain	a	measure	of	
moral	self‐worth	 in	an	environment	where	 ‘the	prison	positions	prisoners	as	unethical	others	 in	need	of	change’	
(Ugelvik	2012:	273).	
17	Cognitive	behavioural	therapy	is	the	most	widely	used	treatment	in	both	general	and	correctional	psychology	and	
usually	consists	of	a	short	series	of	learning	based	sessions	focused	on	changing	behaviour.	
18	CUBIT	stands	for	Custody	Based	Intensive	Treatment	program	for	serious	sex	offenders.	
19	Hall	(2014)	has	argued	that	prisoners	have	difficulty	getting	hold	of	the	official	record	of	their	sentencing	and	other	
important	documents	such	as	risk	assessment.	
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